








Other (please specify with Rights Statement)
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Kristjansson, K 2020, 'Filtering friendship through phronesis: ‘One thought too many’?', Philosophy, vol. 95, no.
1, pp. 113-137. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819119000433
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
This article has been published in a revised form in Philosophy  https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819119000433. This version is free to view
and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution or re-use. © copyright holder.
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
0 
 
Filtering Friendship through Phronesis: 






An adequate moral theory must – or so many philosophers have argued – be compatible with the 
attitudes and practical requirements of deep friendship. Bernard Williams suggested that the 
decision procedure required by both deontology and consequentialism inserts a fetishising filter 
between the natural moral motivation of any normal person to prioritise friends and the decision 
to act on it. But this interjects ‘one thought too many’ into the moral reaction mechanism. It is 
standardly assumed that virtue ethics is somehow immune to this objection. The present article 
explores this assumption and finds it wanting in various respects. Virtue ethics filters friendship 
through phronesis and thus inserts an extra thought into the mechanism in question. To escape 
Williams’s curse, the only way is to argue that the extra thought required by virtue ethics is not 
‘one thought too many’. The article closes with an attempt to show that, contra deontology, the 
friendship motivation in virtue ethics is derived from the moral virtue, not the intellectual filter, 
and, contra consequentialism, phronesis does not require the maximisation of value. The 







For most people, philosophers as well as non-philosophers, friendship constitutes a significant – 
if not necessarily an unalloyed – good, constitutive of human wellbeing. In Aristotle’s view, on 
which most subsequent friendship discussions have drawn, ‘no one would choose to live without 
friends even if he had all the other goods’.1 This does not mean that friendship is the ‘highest 
good’ or, insofar as it is to be understood as a virtue, the ‘master virtue’, trumping all others, for 
other goods, such as health, could well have the same status. Possessing all other conceivable 
goods in life is somewhat useless if one does not have the health to enjoy them. Nevertheless, 
various philosophers have taken up the cudgel for Aristotle and turned friendship into a 
theoretical construct of sufficient moral salience to serve as a benchmark for the evaluation of 
general moral theories. An adequate moral theory must, for example, on Badhwar Kapur’s 




 In a seminal paper by Bernard Williams,
3
 which blazed a trail of numerous follow-ups in 
the next two decades, he argued that both the reigning moral theories of the day, utilitarian 
consequentialism and Kantian deontology, failed this adequacy test for a similar reason: namely, 
by compelling us to subject our obvious natural choice to prioritise the needs of a close friend (or 
a loved one) over those of a stranger, in times of moral danger, to a theoretical decision 
procedure before coming up with the ‘right’ reaction. Such requirements of reflective calculation 
rob us, according to Williams, of psycho-moral reasons to live at all by attacking the source of 
any integrity-grounding prime motivation that makes us tick. The decision procedure required by 
                                                          
1
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. T. Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1985), 207 [1155a5–6]. 
2
 N. Badhwar Kapur, ‘Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship’, Ethics 
101 (1991): 483–504, p. 485. 
3
 B. Williams, Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
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these two moral theories – be it the categorical imperative or the utility calculus – inserts a filter 
(which Williams seems to think of as an artificial gadget or fetish) between the natural moral 
motivation of any normal person and the decision to act on it. But this interjects what Williams 
famously terms ‘one thought too many’ into the moral reaction mechanism and fetishises it in the 
service of a psychologically overbearing theory. 
 The problem identified by Williams has become known as ‘the problem of integrity’, but 
as Williams uses ‘integrity’ in a somewhat idiosyncratic sense with respect to either lay or 
philosophical uses,
4
 I prefer to refer to it as ‘the problem of alienation’. Williams basically urges 
that being held in thrall by the rationalist demands of the categorical imperative or the amoral 
assumption of the utility calculus (which considers pleasure as the highest good) alienates us 
from our most significant others and in the end from ourselves. Juxtaposing this argument with 
Aristotle’s well-known one about the predicament of the vicious who, because they are not 
capable of loving themselves, also become incapable of loving others,
5
 Williams turns the 
psychology upside down: because the moral fetishisers are barred from forming integrity-
grounding unconditional commitments to their beloved ones (including their closest friends), 
they also become alienated from their core commitments to themselves as moral agents that give 
them any reasons for living or acting at all. The ‘one-thought-too-many’ argument has become 
something of a mantra and I revisit it in more detail in Section 2, albeit only insofar as it is 
relevant for the purposes of the present article.  
So what are the ‘present purposes’ then? My aim is, briefly put, to explore a specific 
assumption that has emerged from the above-mentioned literature. While not explicitly elicited 
                                                          
4
 Cf. K. Kristjánsson, ‘Is the Virtue of Integrity Redundant in Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?’ Apeiron 53 (2019): 93–
115. 
5
 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, The Eudemian Ethics, On Virtues and Vices, trans. H. Rackham (London: 
William Heinemann, 1935), 405 [1240b15–19]; op. cit. note 1, 246–247 [1166b1–25]. 
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by Williams himself, the lesson that most scholars seem have drawn from the problem of 
alienation is that virtue ethics is somehow invulnerable to it and hence better equipped to deal 
with the desirably realistic features of common-sense morality that make us commit to it in the 
first place. Needless to say, there are various other features that may draw people towards virtue 
ethics as an alternative to the other two moral theories – one commonly noted being its facility to 
make sense of the role of emotions in the morally good life.
6
 However, it is typically suggested 
or even stated without argument that the fact that only virtue ethics makes do without a filter 
between deep friendship – as a ‘virtue’ or relation between people that ‘involves virtue’7 – and 
moral decisions provides a reason to abandon utilitarianism and deontology and adopt virtue 
ethics as one’s moral theory.8 My aim is to problematise the assumption about this unique 
advantage of virtue ethics. There are many things to like about virtue ethics, but this is, I submit, 
not one of them.  
Notice some odd features about this assumption. First, it is not clearly elicited by 
Williams himself, as already noted. Second, despite the flurry of responses that followed 
Williams’s piece, none developed in detail – to the best of my knowledge – the positive side of 
the argument. In other words, the claim that virtue ethics has unique resources to counter the 
one-thought-too-many argument simply continued to be implicitly assumed rather than argued 
for. Third, the assumption in question would work if Aristotelian virtue ethics were an 
intuitionist moral theory. However, any intuitionist readings of Aristotle tend to be misreadings 
(see Section 3). Alternatively, it would work if friendship were an overriding master virtue in 
Aristotle’s system, but it is not, with Aristotle himself saying in the Eudemian Ethics that those 
                                                          
6
 K. Kristjánsson, Virtuous Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
7
 Op. cit. note 1, 207 [1155a1–2]. 
8
 See e.g. R. F. Card, ‘Consequentialism, Teleology, and the New Friendship Critique’, Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 85 (2004): 149–172, p. 149, although Card refrains from categorising virtue ethics as a ‘theory’. 
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who unreflectively ‘give everything to one whom they love [qua philia] are good-for-nothing 
people’.9 In fact, there is no master moral virtue in Aristotle on a par with, say, justice in Plato.  
There is, however, unquestionably, a meta-virtue in Aristotle’s virtue ethical system: 
namely, the intellectual virtue of phronesis. In addition to helping individual moral virtues find 
means to their ends, phronesis helps solve apparent virtue conflicts, and it also informs the 
content of the virtues as they are understood by the agent, by bringing them into harmony with 
an intellectually grounded blueprint of the good life – for Aristotle’s is not a Humean theory of 
moral motivation. I say more about this in Section 4. At the present juncture, it suffices to note 
that phronesis seems to provide a filter through which any virtuous considerations needs to pass 
– including those of friendship – before they can justifiably issue in either reason-imbued 
emotion (such as compassion towards a friend) or action (such as helping a friend). It is therefore 
hard to shake the impression that phronesis imports an ‘extra thought’ between the motivational 
force of virtuous friendship as a disposition and particular (re)actions of friendship. Does such 
filtering of friendship through phronesis fall prey to Williams’s one-thought-too-many argument 
against moral theories and undermine the assumption about the unique advantage of virtue ethics 
– or do not all extra thoughts count as ‘one thought too many’? These questions call for some 
sustained analysis in subsequent sections. To anticipate, my conclusion will be that while 
Williams’s own understanding of the one-thought-too-many argument is too radical, it is 
worthwhile inquiring what sort of an extra thought counts as detrimental to moral theorising and 
what sort does not. I argue that although phronesis elicits an extra thought, it falls into the latter 
category. 
The kind of friendship I am interested in here, and to which Williams was clearly 
referring, is what we would normally refer to as ‘deep’ or ‘best’ friendship. For the sake of 
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 Op. cit. note 5, 433 [1244a17–19]. 
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simplification, I assume that ‘deep’ or ‘best friendships’, on a contemporary understanding, are 
close enough to ‘character friendships’ in Aristotle’s well-known qualitative tripartite system (of 
friendships for pleasure, utility and character) to speak of them in the same breath. I happen to 
agree also with Aristotle’s controversial contention that the highest and only ‘complete’ form of 
friendship, namely friendship for character, is grounded in moral qualities rather than, say, 
aesthetic ones.
10
 A fair number of caveats would ideally need to be entered here about Aristotle’s 
friendship theory, but I will limit myself to observing that Aristotle’s account of character 
friendships is unduly idealised and insensitive to numerous potential difficulties.
11
 Be that as it 
may, the aim of this article is not to defend an orthodox Aristotelian specification of friendship. 
The aim is rather to argue that the assumption of (deep) friendship, on an everyday contemporary 
understanding, being somehow an unconditional, unreflective virtue in Aristotelian virtue ethics 
is misguided, and that friendship requires ‘filtering’ in Aristotelian virtue ethics just as in the 
other two major moral theories, albeit not filtering that necessarily imports ‘one thought too 
many’. 
 
2. Some reflections on the problem of alienation 
As most of the responses that fuelled the lengthy debate about Williams’s bombshell argument 
have come from consequentialists, and consequentialism is logically closer to virtue ethics than 
deontology (in being teleological), I will focus on those responses here. The aim is not to 
rehearse this debate in any detail, but simply to foreground the features that may be relevant for 
the discussion in the remainder of this article.  
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 Contra e.g. A. Nehamas, On Friendship (New York: Basic Books, 2016). 
11
 K. Kristjánsson, ‘Ten un-Aristotelian Reasons for the Instability of Aristotelian Character Friendships’, Journal 
for the Theory of Social Behaviour 49 (2019): 40–58. 
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 The first thing to note is that the problem of alienation is logically distinct from the other 
standard objection lodged against consequentialist theories, especially of the traditional 
utilitarian kind: the problem of repugnant consequences (aka ‘the problem of victimisation’). 
Whereas the alleged repugnant consequences (e.g. in well-rehearsed transplant and trolley cases) 
point to moral errors in consequentialism, and the typical responses (about the need to focus on 
long-term consequences, including those of precedents set, or on the threat to overall utility 
incurred by sacrificing people in lower moral risk zones for people in higher zones) seek to show 
that consequentialism is not prone to those moral errors, the problem of alienation is not first and 
foremost a moral problem. What sort of a problem is it then? Williams’s own words often 
indicate that it is a problem of rationality: namely, that it is ‘unreasonable for a man to give up 
[…] something which is a condition of his having any interest in being around in the world at 
all’.12 However, a closer look at Williams’s argument reveals an even more menacing and deep-
rooted source, for Williams also introduces the idea of a ‘categorical desire’, the satisfaction or 
non-satisfaction of which settles the question of whether the agent cares to stay alive or not.
13
 
For all normal people, Williams assumes, the desire to prioritise the needs of close friends 
constitutes such a categorical desire. Hence, it is psychologically impossible at the same time to 
suppress this desire (in the interest of a moral theory) and to continue to live. To succumb, say, 
to the utility-maximising demands of consequentialist moral theories is, therefore, not so much 
immoral and irrational as simply stretching human psychology beyond the breaking point. It is, 
in Williams’s sense, not alienating only vis-à-vis the significant other(s), but self-alienating and 
self-destroying. 
                                                          
12
 Op. cit. note 3, 14, my italics; cf. M. Bernstein, ‘Friends without Favouritism’, Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (2007): 
59–76, pp. 67–68. 
13
 Op. cit. note 3, 11. 
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 The standard interpretation of Williams’s argument is, as Wolf correctly points out,14 that 
the psychological impossibility kicks in at the moment of the moral decision. So it is the person 
who thinks at the time of action about what would be morally permissible (e.g. in a case 
involving a choice to save a close friend/spouse versus a stranger) who falls prey to the problem 
of alienation, not the person who prepares herself, for instance, as a moral learner for facing 
moral dilemmas later in life by thinking through various possibilities beforehand in order, say, to 
strengthen her commitment to her categorical desires or to figure out what those really are. 
Incidentally, I agree with Wolf that this interpretation of Williams’s argument is not radical 
enough, but before elaborating on that point, a few reminders are in order about how 
consequentialists have tried to parry it, on the standard interpretation. 
 Responding to Williams has turned into a whole cottage industry. Many of these 
responses take the form of rejecting the claim that thinking through moral possibilities at the 
time of action, in cases such as the above, is bound to alienate the thinker from others and then 
herself. The general complaint is that this argument romanticises and de-intellectualises deep 
friendships overly and overlooks the continually morally reflective and probing nature of at least 
some such friendships.
15
 This general complaint can then be developed along various 
argumentative avenues, for instance by illustrating how, at least in the case of two devoted 
consequentialists, the decision to honour the mutual friendship may be seen as even more 
precious and noble by the friend if it involves, and is reached on the back of, a lengthy reflection 
on the general happiness of humankind.
16
 It is even possible to envisage a conscious pact made 
                                                          
14
 S. Wolf,‘“One Thought too Many”: Love, Morality, and the Ordering of Commitment, in U. Heuer and G. Lang 
(eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012): 71–92, p. 74. 
15
 See e.g. P. Railton’s classic piece, ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality’, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 13 (1984): 134–171. 
16
 See e.g. E. Conee, ‘Friendship and Consequentialism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2001): 161–179; 
Bernstein op. cit. note 12. 
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between two consequentialist friends that they will never favour each other over others except as 
a result of rigorous deliberation about the total state of the world, and that they admire each other 
the more they hold to this pact, even when the friend’s decision goes against them in the end. 
The trouble is that, while one can imagine certain people deriving fulfilment from such 
considerations and such a pact (say, someone like Harriet Taylor and John Stuart Mill), this 
would hardly generalise to the rest of humankind. Indeed, one would be seriously tempted to 
invoke here as examples people at, or close to, the autistic spectrum. Williams’s argument does 
not require that all people have a categorical desire of the sort he describes; it suffices that the 
majority of normal moral agents do. Otherwise, the demands of consequentialism are prone to 
fall foul of Flanagan’s criterion of ‘minimal psychological realism’:17  of not being feasibly 
attainable for (most) beings like us.  
 A more promising line of response is to accept Williams’s claim that thinking through 
moral possibilities at the time of action, in cases such as the one about the friend and the stranger, 
is likely to be self-alienating, and then to make sure somehow that one’s preferred version of 
consequentialism accommodates this fact. One way of doing that is to adopt rule utilitarianism, 
rather than act utilitarianism, as one’s conscious moral theory, and to argue that many privileged 
duties to friends are justified by their overall conduciveness to the maximisation of the general 
good, even if they happen to appear to be utility-reducing in a particular case.
18
 However, rule 
utilitarianism imports problems of its own, both because of its tendency to collapse logically into 
act utilitarianism
19
 and because adopting it consciously as one’s preferred moral theory seems to 
call for reflection at the time of action, which is exactly what Williams’s argument debars us 
                                                          
17
 O. Flanagan, Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1991), 32. 
18
 See e.g. E. Telfer, ‘Friendship’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (1970–1971), 223–241, p. 235. 
19
 D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965). 
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from doing. More plausibly, the consequentialist could stick to act utilitarianism but augment it 
with the psychological thesis that considering alternative possibilities to prioritising the needs of 
a close friend at the time of action is psychologically incompatible with a concern for utility, and 
such considerations should therefore be forestalled. For if it is in fact true that (even considering 
the possibility of) not prioritising the friend robs the agent psychologically of the will to live, 
then there are good consequentialist reasons for habituating oneself into prioritising the friend 
spontaneously (as distinct from adopting the prioritisation as a rule to follow). The objection that 
the world would be better still if considerations of overall utility could be engaged in at the time 
of action will not cut ice with the consequentialist who has taken this psychological thesis on 
board because consequentialism is not a theory about other possible worlds, but just this world, 
and what ‘a consequentialist theory tells us we ought to do is always actually possible’.20 
 At the risk of getting ahead of my argument in Section 3, let me remark here that this 
response to the standard interpretation of Williams’s argument may also seem to make 
Aristotelian phronesis immune to it, at least on one reading of phronesis. Some scholars 
emphasise the developmental function of phronesis as an intellectual virtue that prepares agents 
beforehand for taking the right decision by ‘metabolising the past to simulate possible futures’.21 
This will then explain the facility of phronesis to get things ‘intuitively’ right at the time of 
action. It is not because phronesis itself serves as a vehicle of intuition, but rather because it has 
prepared us so well for what could happen that once we enter into an already-reflected-upon 
situation, all that phronesis needs to do is to activate our sensitivity to this being the sort of 
situation that calls for a certain reaction, without the need for further deliberation at the time of 
action – because perception happens before deliberation and preempts it. On this reading, there 
                                                          
20
 Conee op. cit. note 16, 178–179. 
21
 P. Railton, ‘Intuitive Guidance: Emotion, Information and Experience’, in M. E. P. Seligman, P. Railton, R. F. 
Baumeister and C. Sripade (eds.), Homo Prospectus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016): 33–85, pp. 45–46. 
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does not seem to be any danger of phronesis importing ‘one thought too many’. However, this 
reading does not show virtue ethics to be superior to simple act utilitarianism in this respect, 
provided we grant that the psychological thesis suggested in the preceding paragraph may also 
save act utilitarianism from the problem of alienation. 
 What seems to be too good to be true is usually too good to be true. The whole problem 
to which Williams alerted us seems to have disappeared, simply because initial credibility has 
been granted to the standard interpretation of his argument. Yet on that interpretation the 
argument bewilders rather than enthralls, in particular if it is meant to point towards the 
superiority of virtue ethics as a moral theory. Snatching potential defeat from the jaws of victory, 
Wolf explains well, in an intriguing paper, the extent to which the standard interpretation defangs 
Williams’s argument. Williams’s intention was much more radical that standardly acknowledged: 
namely, not only to show that reflecting on what to do, at the moment of action, in cases 
involving friend–stranger conflicts, is psychologically impossible, in the sense of being self-
alienating, but rather that any reflections on the possibility of betraying the friend will be self-
alienating, even if engaged in ‘off stage’: be it prospectively, to prepare oneself for proper 
decision making at the time of action, or retrospectively, to justify to oneself what one has done. 
Removing the deliberations from the emotionally charged scene of the action does not rescue the 
extra thought from being one thought too many.
22
 
 On this radical interpretation, there is no way in which the strategy invoked above can 
rescue consequentialism because it is impossible to ask the consequentialist to hold all 
considerations regarding the utility of prioritising friends over strangers (or vice versa) in 
abeyance, not only during but also before and after the relevant event. That simply goes against 
the grain of the very idea of consequentialist calculations of the overall good. There must be a 
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 Op. cit. note 14. 
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time in which those can be engaged in, no holds barred. The radical interpretation also brings 
home to us, much more so than the standard interpretation, the sense of ‘moral schizophrenia’ 
that Stocker
23
 famously attributed to the endorsement of the two competing moral theories of the 
day: the sense that those theories propose determinable methods for considering when goods like 
deep friendship ought to be outweighed by more general requirements of duty or the overall 
good.
24
 However, this creates a schizophrenia in the psychology of the normal moral agent to the 
extent that what she is meant to value and calculate as valuable jars with what in fact moves her 
most. Notably, the radical interpretation also casts serious doubts on the facility of Aristotelian 
virtue ethics to escape from the clutches of Williams’s argument, for phronesis is surely 
presented by Aristotle as a method of moral deliberation, and a determinable one at that, 
although admittedly not codifiable in exactly the same sense as the utility calculus or the 
categorical imperative (see further in Section 3). 
 The radical interpretation of Williams’s argument presents us with the following dilemma, 
given the aim of the present article. Either we accept the argument with respect to phronesis, but 
then we implicitly concede that every extra thought of the kind envisaged above will count as 
one thought too many, and that seems to do away with phronesis altogether (unless we 
understand phronesis as some sort of intuitive artistry, outstripping conscious thought, but that is 
a misguided understanding of phronesis, as I argue in Section 3). Or we reject the argument with 
respect to phronesis, but then we need to show either that phronesis does not import an extra 
thought into the decision-making process (which I think is impossible), or that although 
phronesis imports an extra thought qua filter, it is not one thought too many for some substantive 
reasons and hence the ‘filter’ is not ‘fetishising’ in the same way as, say, the utility calculus.  
                                                          
23
 M. Stocker, ‘The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories’, Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 453–466. 
24
 Cf. S. Woodcock, ‘Moral Schizophrenia and the Paradox of Friendship’, Utilitas 22 (2010): 1–25, p. 14. 
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While I propose to go down the second avenue in Section 4, we can safely conclude at 
this juncture that there are no obvious escape routes in Williams’s argument (on the radical 
interpretation) that would prevent Aristotelian virtue ethics from potentially being sent to the 
gallows along with the other two dominant moral theories. However, before that sentence 
phronesis needs a fair and thorough hearing.   
  
3. Phronesis as an intellectual filter 
The important role that the intellectual virtue of phronesis plays in all Aristotelian or quasi-
Aristotelian forms of virtue ethics was noted in Section 1. In order to answer the question of 
whether phronesis imports one thought too many, various considerations need to be addressed 
(see the current and next sections), beginning in this section with some reflections on what 
phronesis really is. To cut a long story short, the easiest way to show that phronesis does not 
import one thought too many about deep friendship would to argue, with regard to the (a) nature 
and (b) content of phronesis, that (a) phronesis does not add an extra thought, but simply serves 
as an intuition pump, and moreover (b) that this pump motivates the unconditional prioritisation 
of deep friendship as a moral concern. I have already provided a citation from Aristotle that 
seems to rule out (b). However, remember that virtue ethics is a naturalistic moral theory, 
answerable to empirical findings on how people actually flourish or wilt, and it could well be the 
case that (b) needs to be revised in the light of new empirical evidence to accommodate a 
primacy-of-friendship intuition. After such revision, phronesis could still potentially be 
considered to retain the spirit, as distinct from the letter, of Aristotelian virtue ethics. 
13 
 
Alternatively, there are other variants of virtue ethics than the Aristotelian one and some of those 
could accommodate friendship as a master virtue.
25
 
 It is more difficult to revise (a) by eliciting other variants because the guidance that all 
leading virtue ethicists in the West tend to follow on phronesis has been wrenched from Aristotle, 
and there is, to the best of my knowledge, no completely un-Aristotelian phronesis theory out 
there (although many theorists rely on MacIntyre’s rendering which departs from Aristotle’s in 
some respects
26). Not all hope is lost, however, of escaping Williams’s curse, for there are almost 
as many variants of ‘Aristotelian’ phronesis as there are Aristotelian exegetes, and some of those 
understand the workings of phronesis first and foremost in terms of intuitive artistry rather than 
as an extra thought, let alone a thought too many. I will consider two of those variants later in 
this section, but first some brief rehearsals of Aristotle’s own account are in order.  
Aristotle’s phronesis is an intellectual virtue (virtue of thought) that serves the purpose of 
living well by monitoring and guiding the moral virtues. Building on emotional dispositions 
cultivated through early-years habituation, phronesis re-evaluates those dispositions critically, 
allowing them to truly ‘share in reason’, and provides the agent with proper justifications for 
them. In addition to latching itself on to every ‘natural’ moral virtue, and infusing it with 
systematic reason, the function of phronesis is to ‘deliberate finely’ about the relative weight of 
competing values, actions and emotions in the context of the question of ‘what promotes living 
well in general’. A person who has acquired phronesis has thus, inter alia, the wisdom to 
adjudicate the relative weight of different virtues in apparent conflict situations and to reach a 
measured verdict about best courses of action.
27
 This is, more or less, where the consensus ends 
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 Cf. D. Cocking and J. Kennett, ‘Friendship and Moral Danger’, Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 278–296; 
Cicero, How to Be a Friend, trans. P. Freeman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 35 and 45. 
26
 See K. Kristjánsson, Aristotle, Emotions and Education (Aldershot: Ashgate/Routledge, 2007), chap. 11. 
27
 Op. cit. note 1, 153, 154, 159, 164, 171 [1140a26–29, 1140b4–6, 1141b30–31, 1143a8–9, 1144b30–32]. 
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on what phronesis really involves and the controversial interpretations begin, which haunt the 
landscape of Aristotelian scholarship. While I want to avoid begging controversial questions 
about what phronesis is, simply for the sake of moving on with the discussion of Williams’s 
argument, I do not think that ‘anything goes’ in Aristotelian exegesis and I reserve the right 
below to reject interpretations that are blatantly un-Aristotelian.  
Let me highlight here the oddity that although phronesis is undergoing a revival, not only 
within contemporary virtue ethics, but also in social scientific circles and in various areas of 
applied professional ethics, no psychological instrument currently exists to measure phronesis 
(although the measure designed by Brienza and colleagues perhaps comes close to it
28
). This is 
even more remarkable given the current burgeoning of so-called wisdom research in 
psychology.
29
 Serious efforts are now afoot, however, to remedy this shortcoming by an 
interdisciplinary team of philosophers and psychologists.
30
 The advantage of instrument design is 
that relevant conceptual nuances need to be elicited and the components of the construct under 
examination identified in detail. According to the fairly minimalist reading by Darnell and 
colleagues of Aristotelian phronesis, it serves at least four distinct functions and thus constitutes 




(i) Constitutive function. This is the ability, and eventually cognitive excellence, which 
enables an agent to perceive what the salient features of a given situation are from an ethical 
perspective, and to see what is required in a given situation as reason(s) for responding in certain 
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ways. (ii) Integrative function. This component involves integrating different components of a 
good life, especially in dilemmatic situations where different ethically salient considerations or 
virtues appear to be in conflict. This function is highly situation-specific, which means that 
traditional wisdom research in psychology, which homes in on more global capacities, is mostly 
irrelevant to the derivation of a phronesis construct. (iii) Blueprint function. Phronetic persons 
possess a general conception of the good life (eudaimonia) and adjust their moral identity to that 
blueprint, thus furnishing it with motivational force. This does not mean that each ordinary 
person needs to have the same sophisticated comprehension of the ‘grand end’ of human life as a 
philosopher or an experienced statesperson might have, in order to count as possessing phronesis. 
Rather the sort of grasp of a blueprint of the aims of human life informing (and informed by) 
phronesis is within the grasp of the ordinary well-brought-up individual and reflected in ordinary 
acts. It draws upon the person’s standpoint of life as a whole and determines the place that 
different goods occupy in the larger context and how they interact with other goods. This 
blueprint is ideally ‘on call’ in every situation of action. (iv) Emotional regulation function. 
Phronesis requires, and contributes to, the agent’s emotions being in line with her construal of a 
given situation, moral judgement and decision, thereby also offering motivation for the 
appropriate response. Notice that emotional regulation must not be understood here in terms of 
emotional suppression or policing, but rather as the infusion of emotion with reason, which 
calibrates the emotion in line with the morally and rationally warranted medial state of feeling, 
and the subsequent harmony between the two. 
To be sure, this identification of the four core components of Aristotelian phronesis does 
not dissolve all exegetical disputes about the concept. However, it does help fend off seriously 
aberrant interpretations, including those which consider phronesis a mere intuition pump. Indeed, 
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I do believe the idea of ‘phronetic intuitionism’ (as espoused e.g. by Kaspar in this journal32) 
involves something of an oxymoron. Let me briefly mention two attempts at ‘intuition-ising’ 
phronesis, one from the current education literature and the other from contemporary moral 
psychology. 
There is a powerful approach in recent educational theory (harking back at least to 
Dunne
33
) which offers an (allegedly Aristotelian) anti-realist, non-foundationalist, perspectivist 
and particularist account of education: most felicitously described as a ‘phronesis-praxix 
appoach’. I have criticised this approach in detail elsewhere34 and will not reapeat that critique 
here except insofar as it relates to an intuitionist reading of phronesis. According to Dunne, we 
need to avoid seeing phronesis in terms of ‘the application of theory to particular cases’.35 In 
praxis, as the sphere of phronesis, ‘practical-moral universals cannot unproblematically cover or 
include particular cases’ precisely because the former contain ‘an element of 
indeterminateness’.36 This is, in Dunne’s words, so far from being a defect that it is, rather, ‘the 
great merit’ of phronesis:37 best captured by terms such as ‘particularist discernment’, ‘intuitive 
artistry’, ‘perceptual capacity’, ‘illative sense’ or ‘situational appreciation’. Phronesis is, in other 
words, the eye of moral experience: the discernment of particular situations that enables us ‘to 
see aright’ every time, but which remains ultimately experiential rather than universal ‘since the 
universals within its grasp are always modifiable in the light of its continuing exposure to 
particular cases’.38 This intuitionist reading of phronesis then allows Dunne and his followers to 
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make sweeping generalisations about the essential uncodifiability of Aristotelian phronesis-
guided ethical and educational decision making. 
The snag is that Aristotle’s much-cited assertion that phronesis is about particulars and 
therefore needs perception
39
 says nothing about the epistemological priority of perception. A 
simpler interpretation is that Aristotle considered universal moral beliefs that would be fully 
capable of taking into account every possible situation to be so complicated – although logically 
possible – that they would in fact be impossible to learn and apply. Think, for instance, of all the 
comparisons that would need to be made between individuals with simultaneous, yet diverse, 
interests. Instead of trying to achieve such a super-human feat, it would be better to acquire a 
perceptual awareness that guides us to the right answer in the greatest number of factual 
situations – as we, more realistically, define only ‘as far as we can’.40 Phronesis, while not 
unproblematically codifiable, because of its ‘practical’ as distinct from ‘theoretical’ subject 
matter, is thus not necessarily (but merely contingently) uncodifiable. A perfect moral theory, 
which resolved once and for all every question of application, would be possible only for a 
perfect being. Yet what remains is the ‘blueprint function’ of phronesis, which applies a general 
conception of the human telos to diverse, complex ethical situations and furnishes the agent with 
theoretical tools – an intellectual ‘filter’ if you like – to think through complex practical 
situations, rather than having to rely simply on hunches.  
A less sophisticated attempt to co-opt Aristotle to the intuitionist camp has recently been 
made by social intuitionists: the proponents of the currently fashionable two-system (dual-
process) theories of moral decision making.
41
 According to social intuitionism, people typically 
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experience a moral intuition about a given state of affairs – an emotion-driven hunch or an 
implicit sense of what is the appropriate reaction. Such intuitions normally do not require explicit, 
effortful reasoning; indeed they seem to persist in the face of contrary rational judgement or of 
the lack of any rationally grounded conviction. They often arise non-voluntarily and are not fully 
articulable. Most importantly, they motivate spontaneous action, uninformed by conscious 
deliberation, although people exhibit a tendency – through motivations such as peer pressure and 
canonical norms of discourse – to justify their actions retrospectively. Here would be the 
proposed Aristotelian corollary, then. Human beings typically act upon motivations provided by 
general traits of character: vicious, virtuous or somewhere in between. We are essentially 
creatures of habits (qua traits). These traits include emotions (pathe) which are the most 
immediate motivators of action. However, we are not really responsible for our episodic 
emotions, such as our bouts of anger or pangs of jealousy; those happen to us rather than being 
chosen by us. Hence, Aristotelian pathe are quite similar to what the social intuitionists such as 
Haidt understand moral intuitions to be. Indeed, those theorists love the idea of ‘automaticity of 
virtue’ in Aristotle.  
The problem with this analogy is that it is over-simplified to the brink of being blatantly 
wrong. To be sure, Aristotle does not deny that we may be driven by knee-jerk reactions to 
events: conditional reflexes and non-cognitive feelings. However, those would not be pathe on 
his understanding, and the claim that pathe are not within our responsibility elides important 
complexities. Let it suffice to say that Aristotelian moral intuitions (qua pathe) are part of a 
learning system that is infused with reason – be it good or bad reason. Moral judgement is in 
essence an exercise of reason. There is no ‘brute’ moral intuition in Aristotle, and even what he 
calls ‘natural virtue’ is not ‘natural’ as in either ‘genetically pre-programmed’ or ‘conditioned by 
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the nature of one’s society’. ‘Natural virtue’ in Aristotle is actually a somewhat infelicitous name 
for a stage of habituated but non-phronetic virtue. True, there is both quick and slow moral 
decision making in Aristotle, but the difference between the two does not correspond to that 
between the non-rational versus rational or to emotion versus reason. Aristotle was simply not a 
two-system dualist, full stop.
42
  
Friendship is indeed a good example here. Early-years habituation, ideally followed by 
years of autonomous, critical honing of one’s dispositions through the exercise of phronesis, 
enables us to react quickly in uncomplicated situations where a close friend needs help. 
Phronesis guides us towards the helping behaviour, almost automatically. However, as soon as 
the situation becomes more complicated, the decision process slows down, as phronesis needs 
time to kick in and evaluate the situation. Do the needs of the friend conflict with those of 
another friend, or perhaps a large group of strangers? Has the friend’s character changed so 
dramatically for better or for worse (although Aristotle himself only considered the latter in any 
detail) that the virtue of friendship does not apply anymore? Furthermore, once we are acting 
through the mediation of phronetic rather than just natural virtue, the filter becomes much more 
demanding, as it requires not only that we comply with the demands of the most immediate 
virtue relevant to the given situation (in our case, friendship) but that it also takes account of 
claims proper to other ethical virtues – say, compassion and justice.43 Friendship as a natural 
virtue may be compatible with your helping the friend for an unjust or foolish cause. However, 
from the perspective of phronesis-guided virtue, the critical dimensions of the virtue of 
friendship are not determined by the architectonic of that particular virtue only but also by the 
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demands of other virtues. All these different requirements need to be synthesised through 
phronesis, and although that synthesis may appear to proceed fairly quickly and reliably in the 
case of an experienced moral agent, to get things right the agent still needs to apply the filter of 
phronesis correctly to the concrete situation. There is no room in Aristotelian theory for a 
phronetic decision that is, in principle, unfiltered. 
Someone like Stocker
44
 could still argue that because of the essential motivational unity 
of the phronetic agent in Aristotle’s virtue ethics, this procedure does not involve the same sort 
of schizophrenia as in the other moral theories and, hence, some (or perhaps all) of the thrust of 
Williams’s argument can be averted. This consideration is, however, bound to touch even the 
greatest of Aristotelian aficionados on the raw, for if there is any psychological claim in Aristotle 
that seems to jar with common intuitions and empirical evidence, it is the one about the 
motivational unity of the phronimoi being such that they never experience regret.
45
 Even those 
contemporary virtue ethicists who go furthest in sticking to the Aristotelian script, such as 
Hursthouse, admit that there are tragic situations from which even the most virtuous agents 
cannot escape with their lives unmarred.
46
 Our ethical outlook as a whole, as well as individual 
moral virtues such as friendship, need indeed, as Hursthouse points out, to be validated over and 
over again, ‘plank by plank’,47 by appealing to the blueprint of the good life as it comes into 
confrontation with complex life situations. This is bound to be a painful process, although 
perhaps not ‘pathological’ in the strict sense that Stocker’s term ‘schizophrenia’ may indicate.48 
The pain cannot be averted by avoiding to apply the filter of phronesis and simply relying on 
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some raw ‘intuitions’. By blocking out the ‘extra thought’ needed to remain and to continue to 
develop as a virtuous agent – and a trusted friend – one proceeds to trivialise the message handed 
down to us by Aristotelian virtue ethics. 
 
4. Is the ‘extra thought’ in virtue ethics also ‘one thought too many’?   
The preceding section demonstrated the futility of the assumption that, because of the alleged 
facility of virtue ethics to motivate correct friendship-instantiating moral action directly without 
the mediation of a theoretical filter, there is something unique about virtue ethics as a moral 
theory that provides immunity from Williams’s one-thought-too-many argument. It turned out 
that there is no such direct motivation in (Aristotle-inspired) virtue ethics. However, scenting 
potential defeat at this juncture, it is still possible for the virtue ethicist to argue that although 
there is an ‘extra thought’ encapsulated by the phronesis filter, it does not involve – as opposed 
to the deontological or consequentialist filters – one thought too many. What could there be 
unique about the phronesis filter that would leave it untouched by the argument that hits at the 
other two filters? I explore four possible responses below. The first response builds on the 
thought that phronesis does not offer a filter in the same sense as the utility calculus or the 
categorical imperative because phronesis is just about methods of implementation, not content. 
The other three responses suggest that although the phronesis filter is essentially of the same 
kind as two competing ones, informing the content of moral decision making (e.g. in the case of 
deep friendship, on which Williams fastens), there is something about its content that escapes or 
at least mitigates the charge of one thought too many.  
 (1) ‘The phronesis filter is only about means-end reasoning; it does not impose 
substantive one-thought-too-many constraints on the moral content of the decision, as do the 
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other two filters; and no moral theory can conceivably work, in any case, without practical 
advice on how to find the best means to actualising what has been decided.’  
This response turns Aristotle-inspired virtue ethicists into pure Humeans about moral 
motivation. For pure Humeans, reason is irrelevant to the choice of ultimate ends, which is based 
on non-deliberative desires only. This thesis seems to follow naturally if we take at face value 
Aristotle’s repeated claims about phronesis only constituting reasoning about means to ends, not 
about the ends themselves that seem rather to be formed non-deliberately through the cultivation 
of (habituated) virtue.
49
 There are other places in Aristotle’s texts that do challenge this 
understanding, however, and there is good reason to take those seriously, because they read as 
more accurate elaborations, or even corrections, of the general thesis about phronesis being 
concerned with means only. There we are told not only that non-intellectual habituation is 
insufficient for full virtue, but that full virtue requires a decision to choose virtue for itself, and 
that decision requires phronesis. So, although phronetic virtue grasps the right ends because the 
virtuous person has the right desires, those desires require phronesis for their creation precisely 
in order to count as the right desires in the first place.
50
 In other words, the transition from 
habituated to phronetic virtue is one of essence: the previously non-intellectually founded desires 
become deliberative desires, and they are no longer the same desires as before, simply dressed up 
in fancy intellectual clothes, but rather new desires, created by phronesis. Hence, I agree with 
Irwin that Aristotle cannot be categorised as a Humean with respect to Hume’s thesis that all 
practical thought depends on non-deliberative desires.
51
 Insofar as Response (1) is meant to 
defend virtue ethics, including the intellectual virtue of phronesis, and insofar as phronesis is an 
essentially Aristotelian concept, Response (1) fails to show that phronesis, in virtue of its 
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proposed exclusive instrumentality, does not incorporate one thought too many – simply because 
it is not exclusively instrumental.  
 (2) ‘What makes consequentialists import one thought too many into their thinking about 
deep friendship is their assumption that the only intrinsically valuable good in the world is 
pleasure, and that non-intrinsically valuable goods such as friendship need to be measured 
against it. Similarly, for deontologists, the ultimate moral motivation is derived from respect for 
the categorical imperative rather than from an intrinsically valuable virtue such as friendship. In 
contrast, for virtue ethicists, virtues such as friendship are intrinsically valuable.’  
 In Kantian deontology, the moral motivation to pursue friendship (or any other virtue) 
does not have its source in the emotional component of the relevant virtue, as in Aristotle-
inspired virtue ethics, but in principles of practical reason, encapsulated by the categorical 
imperative. If the substantive problem identified by Williams’s argument is that the crucial moral 
motivation is derived from the filter rather than the original source of moral concern (here the 
friendship), then it is indeed true that virtue ethics escapes his charge. However, I do not think 
the same applies, mutatis mutandis, to virtue ethics versus sophisticated forms of 
consequentialism. Badhwar Kapur complains that ‘consequentialist teleology defines intrinsic 
value in morally neutral terms and morality as a means to intrinsic value’.52 While that is, strictly 
speaking, true, the implications are not as radical as Badhwar Kapur makes them out to be. For 
Mill,
53
 for example, virtues such as justice (and arguably friendship) constitute essential goods 
that are parts of the sole source of intrinsic value, happiness as pleasure and the absence of pain, 
rather than just being instrumentally conducive to it. Those are goods that ought to be valued, 
whether or not we happen to value them or not, and also goods whose moral value remains intact 
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even in the rare cases when they are outweighed by other, more salient, essential goods.
54
 Thus, 
for the happiness pluralist Mill, the motivation to help a friend would derive from the essential 
goodness of friendship, rather than from the utility calculus itself. That calculus is only necessary 
because there are cases where the motivations of different essential goods clash. 
 There is, in fact, not much to choose between (Millian) consequentialism and virtue 
ethics here. To love a friend ‘as an end’, Badhwar Kapur says, ‘is to place a special value on her 
– to believe that her value is not outweighed, say, simply by the greater needs of others or the 
needs of a greater number of others’.55 But this only holds if friendship is the sole intrinsic value 
in her axiology
56
 or if she considers friendship as a master virtue, like Cicero who insisted that 
‘you should place friendship above all other human concerns’.57 But those are clear departures 
from Aristotle and from most contemporary forms of virtue ethics, according to which the 
intrinsic value of friendship can in principle be overridden by another competing source of 
intrinsic value. Phronesis can be defined as excellence in moral deliberation precisely because of 
its capacity to adjudicate correctly in cases where two such sources seem to clash. In that 
particular sense, it serves the same purpose as the utility calculus. So if there is something about 
the content of the intellectual filter that separates virtue ethics from consequentialism and 
protects it against the charge of one thought too many, Response (2) has not identified what that 
unique content is.  
 (3) ‘Phronesis allows for preferential treatment but the other filters force us to treat all 
persons equally. It is the psychologically impossible requirement of non-preferential treatment 
that makes the other two filters, but not phronesis, succumb to the error of one thought too many.’ 
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 It is helpful to remember that while the great medieval Christian thinkers retrieved, 
accommodated and ‘infused’ most of Aristotle’s basic tenets about the virtues, they remained 
sceptical of any insights that implied elitism, favouritism or differential treatment based on 
people’s allegedly unequal claims to moral worth. Christianity is, after all, at its core an 
egalitarian moral system, within which one is meant to love all one’s ‘neighbours’ equally 
through agape rather than through the favouritism-tainted lens of philia. This assumption was 
then subsumed within the two great secular systems of morality that developed during the 
Enlightenment. Is this perhaps what makes their two filters import one thought too many, on 
Williams’s understanding (as suggested e.g. by Bernstein58)? After all, Aristotle says, in contrast, 
that it is ‘more shocking’ to ‘rob a companion of money than to rob a fellow-citizen’ and to ‘fail 
to help a brother than a stranger’.59 
 While it is true that impersonality and impartiality are foreign to the spirit of Aristotelian 
virtue ethics, agent-relativity is in no way a random, subjective variable in Aristotle. In addition 
to the somewhat pedantic specific advice that Aristotle gives here (about returning favours to 
benefactors before favouring a friend and returning debts to creditors before making loans to 
friends
60 ), it is crystal clear that Aristotle’s partiality allowances are meant to be strictly 
calibrated according to demonstrated levels of moral virtue. Firstly, character friends are chosen 
precisely because of their ethical excellence, and they are to be discarded if they turn bad beyond 
redemption. Secondly, Aristotle discusses in detail conflicts that arise between the claims that a 
friend can have on us, versus a virtuous non-friend, and his conclusion is that if the friend is just 
a utility friend, then her claims on us are strictly limited, whereas the issue becomes more 
complicated if the clash is between the claims of a character friend and another ‘virtuous man’, 
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for the former is then also, ex hypothesi, virtuous. The overall conclusion seems to be that this 
has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis but, in any case, simply ditching agent-neutrality and 
giving everything spontaneously to the friend is what only ‘good-for-nothing people’ do.61  
 These Aristotelian considerations are far removed from the romanticised view of 
friendship as based on spontaneous preferential treatment that Bernstein,
62
 for one, attributes to 
Williams. There is no hint in Aristotle of an aestheticised view of friendship as lying beyond the 
limits of moral justification (as e.g. espoused by Nehamas
63
) and beyond the scope of phronesis. 
The idea that the non-reflective partiality of friendship holds the key to how phronesis escapes 
the thrust of Williams’s argument seems to be a non-starter. To Williams’s credit, that idea is not 
his in the first place, for he explicitly admits that the notion of an attachment to a particular 
person as a psychological integrity-grounding project, in his sense, protected by a categorical 
desire, would have appeared ‘mysterious or even sinister’ to Aristotle.64  
 (4) ‘The uniqueness of phronesis as a filter vis-à-vis the utility calculus is that it does not 
require the maximisation of value. That requirement is the main reason why consequentialism 
imports one thought too many. Hence, this criticism does not hit at phronesis-guided reflections 
on what friendship requires in particular cases.’ 
 To be sure, although Aristotle places fairly strict moral constraints on the scope of agent-
relativity that virtue ethics affords us, there is no hint of the idea of maximisation in his ethics. 
That is not to say that moral value comes without any quantification, for generally speaking, ‘the 
greatest virtues are necessarily those most useful to others’, such as justice and courage.65 Yet 
virtue comes to us individuality-adjusted according to Aristotle. There is no description of an 
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individual’s virtue repertoire available to us that abstracts from its instantiation in that person in 
all her psycho-social uniqueness. Some of the well-known things that Aristotle says about the 
golden mean of action and emotion may seem to indicate that there is an ideal imitable agent 
whose virtue consists in hitting this mean accurately on each occasion. However, on closer 
inspection, there is no unique blueprint of the perfectly virtuous person per se to aim for. For 
example, emulousness is a virtue for young people whereas adults do not need to emulate role 
models. Magnificence and magnanimity are virtues for people blessed with unusually abundant 
material resources but not for ordinary folks. Temperance in eating is not the same for Milo the 
athlete as for the university professor, because what is intermediate in virtue is relative to the 
individual, ‘not in the object’.66 And, from an educational perspective, a boxing instructor will 
not ‘impose the same way of fighting on everyone’.67 There is thus no one best way across 
individuals to be, say, virtuously generous as opposed to be being stingy or wasteful. It all 
depends on your individual circumstance (are you poor or wealthy?) and your own natural 
inclination towards either extreme, away from which you should try to drag yourself – with the 
help of friends. When I love the generosity of my friend, I do not love it as matching well or less 
well the repeatable generosity of the perfectly generous person, for there is no such generosity 
simpliciter. There is an endless plurality of traits that all make the grade as virtuous generosity, 
as instantiated in different persons, and there is no way to choose between them in ways that 
satisfies some ideal condition of virtue-exposure maximisation.  
The non-existence of a maximisation requirement (because there is no common currency 
to maximise) gives us considerable leverage in making wise phronetic choices regarding 
conflicting claims by different friends, or friends and (virtuous) non-friends, and some may even 
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legitimately come down to mere tastes when there is no difference in demonstrated levels of 
moral worth.  
Out of all the responses canvassed so far, this one comes closest to explaining the 
potential advantage of Aristotle-inspired virtue ethics, in general, and its phronesis filter, in 
particular, in escaping the thrust of Williams’s one-thought-too-many argument. Yet I am not 
convinced that this response would have satisfied Williams himself, given the radical (and 
probably accurate) interpretation of his argument explained in Section 2. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This article has explored the common assumption that there is something about Aristotle-inspired 
virtue ethics that makes it immune to Williams’s infamous one-thought-too-many argument. I 
have shown that the idea that virtue ethics has no filter, and hence imparts no extra thought into 
the moral decision process, is untenable. The reason is the simple one that Mill pointed out to us 
a long time ago: ‘There exists no moral system under which there do not arise unequivocal cases 
of conflicting obligations’.68 So far is it from being true that Aristotle suggests an exception to 
this rule that he explicitly provides us with a filter, called phronesis, to sort out how to strike a 
morally justifiable balance between competing sources of intrinsic value. To argue that this filter 
does not import an extra thought, it would have to be shown that phronesis is an intuition pump, 
rather than an intellectual virtue of adjudication and, furthermore, that the intuition to favour 
friends trumps all other considerations. However, neither happens to fit Aristotle’s system. At all 
events, it is difficult to imagine Williams asking for blind attachment to friendship, to which any 
extra thought would be inimical.  
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To escape Williams’s curse, the only remaining way is to argue that the extra thought 
required by virtue ethics is not ‘one thought too many’. The presumed advantage of virtue ethics 
must, in other words, lie in the content of its filter rather than the filter’s non-existence. The 
article closed with an attempt to show that, contra deontology, the friendship motivation in virtue 
ethics is derived from the moral virtue, not the intellectual filter, and, contra consequentialism, 
phronesis does not require the maximisation of value. This argument goes some distance in 
shielding phronesis from Williams’s complaint. Yet the work that still remains for phronesis to 
do, and the way it is meant to do it, would probably still count as a fetish on Williams’s 
understanding, as well as falling under Stocker’s sarcastic description of decision filters as 
‘mental alarm clocks’.69 So there is no way to avoid a substantive disagreement between a neo-
Aristotelian, such as the present author, and Williams on what exactly counts as one thought too 
many.  
I happen to agree with Woodcock
70
 that balancing our broad ethical obligations with 
authentic personal motives is bound to remain a non-trivial psychological challenge for any 
moderately demanding moral theory. I salute Aristotle for having tried to offer us an extra 
thought to guide our reflections on this challenge, and I maintain that the phronesis filter does 
not deserve the sardonic designation of ‘one thought too many’. Filtering friendship through it is 
a morally justifiable, and indeed necessary, enterprise.      
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